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I. — IntroductIon
Since Coase’s classical article (Coase, 1937), the problem of the integration
of different activities in the same firm has been the Holy Grail of organization
theory. Economists have a theory of markets which « proves» that they lead to
efficient allocations ; most economists also believe that markets are, overall,
quite efficient. Yet, as Weitzman (1974) puts it, « the price system does not
pass the market test »: in market economies, firms choose to bypass the mar-
ket in order to manage resources through bureaucratic procedures.
This circumventing of the price system shows itself in two ways. First, firms
do not use the price system internally as a way to allocate resources. The
second theorem of welfare economics tells us that, under some, non inno-
cuous, conditions, any efficient allocation can be decentralized through a price
system, but firms generally choose to use a command system rather than inter-
nal prices (1). Second, firms often choose to produce inputs in-house rather
than to acquire them from another firm, either by developing the capacities for
internal production or by purchasing a supplier.
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(1) Firms do use « transfer prices» to measure the performance of units within the firm.
However, these different units are not free to trade at these prices.
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Understanding the reason for this latter phenomenon seems an inviting path
to understanding the role that firms play in the economy. It is not the aim of
this article to do a complete literature survey, but I believe that it is fair to say
that Williamson (1985) discussed the challenges facing this research program
in a way which influenced much of the subsequent literature.
The aim of this paper is to focus on one of the crucial challenges identified
by Williamson : the selective intervention puzzle. Simplifying to the extreme,
he asked the following question : it seems that nothing would prevent the
owner of a firm from purchasing one of its suppliers and then to tell the mana-
gers of what have now become two units of the same firm to behave as if the
merger had not taken place. This would prove that, at its worse, vertical inte-
gration is never worse than vertical disintegration, which is clearly counter-
factual.
In classical principal-agent theory, as presented in the pioneering contribu-
tions of, for instance, Baron and Myerson (1982) and Holmström (1979), the
principal offers a contract to the agent, who takes the actions that his self inter-
est dictates. By contrast, in the more recent literature, the principal does not
quit the stage once the contract is written : he chooses some actions and makes
decisions – in some sense, he becomes one of the agents whose behavior is
affected by the terms of the contract. This feature provides a framework
through which one can analyze the consequences of different organizational
forms and provides for a much richer view of organizations in general and ver-
tical integration in particular. In particular, I will argue that it is the critical fea-
ture in all the models that provide solutions to the selective intervention puzz-
le. Indeed, this is the unifying basis on which the different « solutions» which
have been proposed rest, whether they are described in the literature in terms
of incomplete contracts, inability to commit to future actions, or influence acti-
vities.
II. — What Is vertIcal IntegratIon?
2.1. definition
The framework that most economists have used to tackle the problem of ver-
tical integration is presented in figure 1. A downstream activity, D, uses some
input provided by an upstream activity, U.We will assume that these two acti-
vities are run by two different production units which bear the name of the
activity in which they engage. Under « vertical separation », these two units
belong to two independent firms – in most of our discussion, we will assume,
for simplicity, that these firms are only composed of these units. Under « ver-
tical integration», these two units belong to the same firm. The theory of ver-
tical integration tries to understand when each of these two solutions is more
efficient than the other.
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It is important to note that in reality all firms are vertically integrated. In res-
taurants, the food is an input to the activity of serving the customer and the
kitchen (U) and the dining room (D) are jointly owned. In the kitchen itself,
peeled carrots are an input for the production of stew, and the activity of pee-
ling the carrots (U) is run in the same firm as the cooking of the stew (D), at
least for restaurants who do not buy their carrots in plastic bags ! In universi-
ties, the administration of classrooms (U) is an input to the teaching activities
(D) and they are both run by the university. (Of course, the same holds true
for horizontal separation – all firms conduct different operations which could
conceivably be run in parallel. The same type of theories would apply in this
case).
It is also true that no firm is fully integrated. There is always at least some
raw machinery or some input that is purchased from other sources. In recent
years, improvement in information technology has allowed firms to pursue
strategies of vertical separation to an unprecedented degree (Malone and
Laubacher (1998) discuss this phenomenon in an entertaining, and somewhat
extreme, way).
Therefore, the problem which we have to solve is not so much « Is vertical
integration good or bad in this or that situation? » but rather « To which degree
should the firm be vertically integrated? ». This is the question which was
asked by Coase. He went on to answer that a firm would integrate activities up
to the point at which the marginal benefit of integrating another one would be
equal to the cost. Alas, Coase provided very little guidance to the evaluation
of these marginal benefits and marginal costs – this is the gap that the subse-
quent literature has spent much efforts trying to solve.
FIgURe 1 : U and D are two different activities. The boxes represent the
boundaries of the firms. Without vertical integration, activities U and D are
run by two different, independent firms. Under vertical integration,
they are run by the same firm.
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2.2. do we already know the solution?
One of the difficulties which we face when we try to theorize the problem of
vertical integration is that sometimes the solution seems too obvious. Figure 2
illustrates an example, first proposed by Klein, Crawford, and Alchian (1978),
which I like to use in my classes. Oil is extracted in a well, and must be trans-
ported to a refinery where it will be transformed into a usable final product. In
one case, the well is in the middle of the desert and the oil is transported
through a pipeline to the refinery. In the second case, the well is situated on the
side of the sea and is transported by boat to the refinery. It seems intuitively
clear that vertical integration is more appropriate for the first case than for the
second. 90% of my graduate students « get it ». 
It is not very difficult to go further and to see that the crucial difference bet-
ween the two panels of figure 2 is the presence of specific capital. When oil is
transported through a pipeline the capital invested in the well, the pipeline and
the refinery can only be used in the case of the relationship between the three
entities. On the other hand, when oil is transported by boat, the well can easi-
ly be used in conjunction with another boat and/or another refinery. Similarly,
the boat can be used to transport oil from other wells to other refineries. None
of the capital which is invested looses value if the relationship between the
three parties is disbanded.
The traditional dialogue then follows : if one can write contracts between
separate firms who each manage one of the three activities oil extraction, trans-
portation and refining, why cannot we do just as well as if they are managed by
the same firm? And the usual answer follows : because of incomplete contracts.
FIgURe 2 : This figure illustrates the consequences of specific capital
for vertical integration,
following an example of Klein, Crawford, and Alchian (1978)
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This is the story that Klein, Crawford, and Alchian tell so well when they
discuss the story of Fisher Body : the separation of the production of car bodies
from car itself became impossible to maintain as more capital was used and
this capital became more specific.
III. — the selectIve InterventIon puzzle
The discussion of specific capital of Klein, Crawford, and Alchian does ans-
wer the question : « what type of inefficiencies of markets create incentives for
firms to integrate? ». This identifies at least one of the marginal benefits of
integration of Coase, but does not help in the identification of its marginal
costs. And yet, firms do not integrate activities without bounds.
For Williamson (1985), the solution was to be found in the changes in incen-
tives that come with vertical integration. He begun by accepting the thesis that
vertical integration facilitates the writing of contracts and the use of specific
capital, and that, by so doing, it decreases the cost of production. However, he
also argued that it decreased the « power» of incentives ; the owner of an inde-
pendent supplier of inputs will be more responsive than the manager of a divi-
sion that would produce the same inputs. Because the benefits of vertical inte-
gration increase with specificity of capital but the costs in terms of power of
incentives do not, we will indeed see more vertical integration with highly spe-
cific capital.
The difficulty is that this phenomenon is not understandable within traditio-
nal contract theory. Indeed, it would seem that after vertical integration, the
owner of the U firm has more means of controls available to obtain what he
wants D firm to achieve. If this is the case, he can mimic the contract that
would be offered in the absence of vertical integration, and hence can never be
worse off than under separated ownership. More precisely, the owner of the
combined entity of which the U and the D firms are now divisions, could tell
the managers of these two divisions « act as you would if you were separate
firms». Hence, vertical integration would never make the situation worse. And
the owner could always offer some very minor variations on the original
contract, which would improve his profits (for instance, sharing the same sup-
plier of stationary, or a parking lot) – this is the selective intervention part. Of
course, this is not supposed to be a proof of the fact that the optimal contract
after vertical integration is a simple variation on the optimal contract before
vertical integration ; but it « proves » that vertical integration can never decrea-
se profits and should in nearly all cases increase them. This is clearly counter-
factual ; hence, the term « paradox of selective intervention ». 
There are two aspects which we can stress when discussing this paradox.
One is whether or not selective intervention is indeed possible, that is would it
be possible for the owner to intervene only sometimes and only with a light
touch. If the answer to this question is negative, then it is not true that vertical
integration is always strictly superior to vertical disintegration. This is the
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aspect on which, for instance, Foss (2005) focuses. This is also the way in
which Masten (1999) summarizes Williamson’s answer :
« Williamson’s answer to the question “what limits firm size?” lays in the
impossibility of selective intervention (1985, chap. 6). Unable to use the courts
to enforce promise to intervene selectively, management would be drawn to
intervening even when joint benefits are not realized. Without effective assu-
rances that owners will not appropriate performance enhancements, the incen-
tives of division managers to innovate, maintain assets, acquire and utilize
information, and otherwise invest in the efficient operation of the division are
ineluctably compromised. In their place, the firm is forced to substitute wea-
ker, indirect incentives dependent on managerial oversight. The loss of incen-
tive intensity combined with the limited capacity of management to adminis-
ter additional transactions – which manifest themselves in a variety of bureau-
cratic inefficiencies – ultimately undermines the efficacy of internal organiza-
tion and thereby limit firm size ».
On the other hand, one could focus on whether it would be possible for the
owner even to implement a contract that yields the same outcome than the out-
come under vertical disintegration. This is the aspect on which Milgrom and
Roberts (1990) focus in the following passage :
« Williamson’s treatment of these issues is also based on an incentive argu-
ment. He focuses on why “high-powered”, marketlike incentives that replicate
residual claimant status are not feasible within a centrally managed organization
– that is, he focuses on why selective intervention is not in fact possible ».
If we succeed in proving that a contract that replicates the same outcome as
vertical disintegration does not exist, then we have showed that Williamson’s
« proof » that vertical integration is never strictly inferior to market transac-
tions is wrong. (Of course, Williamson presented his proof as a puzzle and did
not believe it himself).
In order to lighten and shorten the discussion, we will not in the sequel
always carefully distinguish between these two aspects of the puzzle.
Iv. — grossman & hart
4.1. how does the model of grossman and hart work?
The widely cited Grossman and Hart (1986) paper was a first formal answer
to Williamson’s challenge of building a model that would go around the selec-
tive intervention paradox. Its features are well known. An agent and a princi-
pal contract for the provision of a good. After they come to an agreement, they
each must take some action which will affect the profitability of the project.
Once these actions have been taken, they bargain to know whether or not to
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continue the project. If they do come to an agreement, and continue, they split
the profits as predicted in the contract.
The actions that the parties take after having reached an agreement are « non
contractible », that is the parties cannot write a contract that in any way
influences the action that they are taking. On the other hand, their bargaining
position in the subsequent negotiation affects the actions which they are
taking. And their bargaining position depends in turn on the allocation of pro-
perty rights between the principal and the agent. If the principal owns the asset
of the downstream firm (i.e., under vertical integration), he controls the use of
the asset in case the bargaining does not lead to an agreement. On the other
hand, if the agent owns the asset (i.e., in the absence of vertical integration),
he controls the use of the asset.
This change in the control of the asset affects the outcome of the bargaining,
and in turn affects the incentives of the agents to take this or that action in the
phase that precedes it. Grossman and Hart identify some conditions under
which one or the other mode of allocation of property rights is optimal. It is
worthwhile noticing, that, in their model, the only way in which the agents can
be given incentives is through the allocation of property rights (2).
The idea that contracts do not specify completely the set of actions that the
agents can take is an old idea in the economic literature. The first paper that I
know which explicitly discusses incomplete contract is Simon (1951). Simon
argues that the contract between an employer and an employee is necessarily
incomplete. Indeed, a complete contract would contain a description of the
tasks that the employee has to perform in any foreseeable future circumstance,
as well as a formula for determining the salary as an function of these tasks.
This is, of course, impossible in practice. Therefore a employment contract
simply specifies a set of tasks that the employer-principal has the right to ask
from the agent-employee, and leaves him the right to choose any action (or
combination of actions) in that set, as he feels warranted. In exchange, the
contract fixes a set salary for the employee.
And, of course, as we have discussed above, the fact that the presence of spe-
cific capital is an important determinant of the desirability of vertical integra-
tion had often been discussed in the literature.
What seems to me to be the most original contribution of the Grossman Hart
paper was that they pointed out explicitly that a contract was not simply a tech-
nique to control the behavior of one economic agent, but rather organized a
(2) Hart and Moore (1988) and Hart and Moore (1990) follow basically the same methodolo-
gy, while expanding the framework to more than two agents and more than one asset.
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game to be played by the different parties. In a standard moral hazard problem,
à  la Holmström (1979), the principal’s only role is to offer a contract to the
agent, he then withdraws from the scene and the only player in the subsequent
game is the agent, who must decide whether or not to accept the contract, and,
if he accepts it, must decide how much effort to exert. In a standard adverse
selection problem, à  la Baron and Myerson (1982), the principal simply offers
a contract to the agent, and then it is up to the agent to decide, given the pay-
ment schedule offered by the contract, how much to produce. The Simon
model of employee-employer relationship shares this feature, except for the
fact that it is the principal who must choose an action once the contract has
been signed.
For Grossman and Hart on the other hand, the contract sets up the rules of a
game in which both the principal (in their case firm U) and the agent (firm D)
will participate. If we define the principal as the party who proposes the
contract, there are one principal and two agents : firm D, but also the « post-
contracting» firm U – this is represented in table 1. And the principal must
worry about the incentives of both these agents when he chooses the terms of
the contract.
Notice that the principal cannot commit not to intervene after the contract is
signed. By assumption, there will be states of nature (3) in which the contract
does not specify the actions that should be taken (4) ; in these circumstances,
it will be possible for the owner of the assets to do whatever it pleases with
them, but this is inefficient. Hence, there are incentives to renegotiate, and no
way ex ante to renounce this possibility.
4.2. riordan’s discussion of grossman and hart
The importance of this change in contract theory can perhaps best be unders-
tood through an examination of Riordan (1990), which presents an early cri-
« traditional» contract theory grossman and hart & subsequent authors
❶ Principal offers contract Principal offers contract
❷ Agent acts Principal & agent act
TAble 1 : Comparing the role of the principal in different theories
(3) In the formal model that Grossman and Hart present, there is no contract stricto sensu, and
therefore what actions have to be taken is never specified. However, as the discussion in
the paper shows the model is supposed to be a caricature that shows what happens in a
reality where not all states of nature are covered by the contract.
(4) I am purposely avoiding discussions of the foundation of incomplete contracts à  la
Maskin and Tirole (1999), which would take us too far afield.
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tique of Grossman and Hart : Riordan disagrees with the definition of vertical
integration which they propose. As we have seen above, for Grossman and
Hart, vertical integration is defined by the control of the assets of firm U by
firm D. They argue that this changes the way in which the second stage rene-
gotiation will take place, by changing the status quo solution, i.e., the power
given to the different parties in case the negotiations break down : under verti-
cal integration, the downstream firm will be able to take control of the assets
and do whatever it wants with them, while under vertical disintegration, it will
the upstream firm which will control the assets. Riordan argues that it is the
right to control the internal management controls of the firm which really
defines vertical integration, and not the control of assets (5). He illustrates his
argument through two examples :
a « A firm buys material inputs and contracts for the specific rights to
employ labor and capital services in an upstream production process ». 
B « A firm contracts for output from a supplier but leases to the supplier
some specialized asset used in its production ».
He argues that in case a, Grossman and Hart would say that there is no ver-
tical integration because the upstream firm owns its capital, whereas, accor-
ding to his definition there is vertical integration, as firm D manages all the
assets which are used in the production process. On the other hand, in case B,
the situation is reversed : there is vertical integration for Grossman and Hart,
but not for Riordan.
The analysis of the consequences of vertical integration are radically diffe-
rent with Riordan’s definition and with Grossman and Hart’s. In particular,
Riordan’s provides a straightforward explanation of the reasons why vertical
integration lowers the power of incentives. After vertical integration, firm U
cannot commit to give very large rewards to firm D for exceptional perfor-
mance : because it controls its management control system, it would manipu-
late the measurement of performance rather than pay what is promised. Hence,
the access to better information comes at a cost : the inability to commit.
For our purposes, the important point is to notice that Riordan is, certainly
implicitly, applying the same methodology as Grossman and Hart. After the
contract is signed, the principal still can take some actions – in his case, mani-
pulate the accounts of firm U when he has the power to do so. In the very
simple model that he uses, he does this anytime he owes anything to his subor-
dinate.
(5) A similar point is made by (Milgrom and Roberts, 1990, p. 72) : « … the crucial distin-
guishing characteristic of a firm is not the pattern of asset ownership but the substitution
of centralized authority for the relatively unfettered negotiations that characterize market
transactions ».
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The solution to the selective intervention puzzle is very simple in this case.
Under vertical integration, firm D cannot obtain that firm U does the same
thing than without vertical integration because its own actions will be diffe-
rent. We can only represent this fact through models where a) the principal
takes an action after the contract is signed and b) these actions are different
with and without vertical integration. From a modeling point of view, point b)
can be implemented in two different ways. The first, and technically easiest, is
to simply assume, as Riordan does, that vertical integration opens up the pos-
sibility of actions that would not be possible otherwise. The other, which was
used by Grossman and Hart is to assume that vertical integration changes the
incentives of firm U, and therefore the relative costs of obtaining different
actions from its management is different (in particular, the same contract will
yield different outcomes). Trading off these different costs will lead to diffe-
rent outcomes.
v. — other lIterature
5.1. no commitment, renegotiation and the like
Of course, models where the principal « stays on the scene » after the signa-
ture of the contract are now standard fare. For instance, renegotiation proof-
ness implies that the principal can propose and/or accept a new contract after
the original contract has been signed. Similarly, the literature on repeated
contracting without commitment assumes that the principal is able to offer a
new contract after the first one has been executed. (For textbook discussions
of these issues, see Bolton and Dewatripont (2005), Laffont and Martimort
(2001) or Salanié (2005)). Personally, as far as I remember, I understood the
issue for the first time from Khalil (1997), who studies a standard Baron-
Myerson with auditing, but assumes that the principal cannot commit to a pro-
bability of audit. The contract simply gives him the right to audit. Then, the
principal becomes a player in the game defined by the contract, and he must
be provided the right incentives to audit often enough. Khalil shows that this
changes fundamentally the structure of the optimal mechanism: there is over-
production, rather than underproduction, in the « bad » state of nature. Having
to give incentives to the principal changes fundamentally the problem of desi-
gning the optimal contract (6).
5.2. subsequent work on vertical integration
I would like to finish this discussion by briefly reviewing two other families
of vertical integration models and showing that they use the same strategy to
(6) It also makes the problem much harder to solve, as the revelation principle (Myerson,
1981) does not hold.
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solve the selective intervention puzzle. This is far from a survey of the verti-
cal integration literature and is just aimed at stressing the main point of this
paper : the solution to the selective intervention puzzle lies in the change of the
description of the role of the principal.
5.2.1. Relational contracts
In recent years, a number of authors have used « relational contracts » to
explore the reasons for vertical integration, and its limits (Baker, Gibbons, and
Murphy, 2002 ; Levin, 2003). This literature presents a dynamic extension of
the Grossman-Hart-Moore framework where the principal and the agent have
limited commitment power to long run contracts ; one of its aims is to unders-
tand better the relationship between explicit, legally enforceable, contracts and
implicit, non legally enforceable, contracts. Indeed, most contractual relation-
ships are based on a mixture of these two types of contracts. You have a legal-
ly enforceable contract with your employer : he must pay you and you must
show up for work. But there are also, in general, many non legally enforceable
aspects of these contracts : « if you work hard, we will be flexible about the
dates at which you can go on vacation ». The relational contract literature tries
to understand how these two types of contract interact with each other.
Because it assumes that the parties sign a new contract in each period, the prin-
cipal never « leaves the scene ». The first period contract must take into
account what his future strategy will be, and this implies, as in Grossman and
Hart, that the incentives schemes are fundamentally different with or without
vertical integration.
5.2.2. Influence activities
In a number of papers, Paul Milgrom and John Roberts have stressed the fact
that vertical integration opens the path to « influence activities » (see Milgrom
and Roberts, 1988 ; Meyer, Milgrom, and Roberts, 1992). A good summary is
provided by Milgrom and Roberts (1990) :
« Influence costs arise first because individuals and groups within the orga-
nization expend time, effort and ingenuity in attempting to affect others’ deci-
sions to their benefit and secondly because inefficient decisions result either
directly from these influence activities or, less directly, from attempts to pre-
vent or control them ».
Milgrom and Roberts explain that one would think that it would be easy to
avoid influence activities : « simply have decision makers ignore attempts at
influence ». However, the policy of ignoring attempts at influence is not feasible :
« ex post, when relevant information is available and those at lower levels
have already taken actions that cannot be reversed, there will be interventions
that are now organizationally desirable and that the center will thus want to
take ». 
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It is therefore because the principal cannot remove himself from the game
that influence activities prevent selective intervention. The aim of the present
paper has been to show that this is the case of all the solutions to the selective
intervention paradox.
5.3. Benevolent principal
Some of the literature has stressed the fact that the intervention of the prin-
cipal in the second stage of the contract creates problems because he is not
benevolent. For instance, in the quote on page 5, Masten (1999) states
« Without effective assurances that owners will not appropriate performance
enhancements…». Similarly, Milgrom and Roberts (1990) state that « two
kinds of cost generally accompany increases in discretionary centralized acti-
vity » that, according to them, necessarily accompany vertical integration ;
« the first kind arises because those with discretionary authority may misuse it
directly, on their own initiative ». However, the fact that the new owner of the
integrated firm is benevolent would not, by itself, be sufficient to make the
selective intervention puzzle irrelevant.
For instance, in Crémer (1995), I develop a model which tries to explain why
cutting off the flow of information to the principal, as vertical disintegration
would do, can provide for more powerful incentives. In this model, in the first
period, the agent can signal his quality through his effort, as both increase the
likelihood of a good outcome. When the principal has a direct source of infor-
mation on the quality of the agent, he will be able to know that the agent is of
high quality even when the outcome is bad, and this decreases the incentives
for high effort. The solution to the selective intervention puzzle in this case is
the fact that the optimal contract under vertical disintegration is not renegotia-
tion proof in the second period – indeed renegotiation can only takes place if
it does not hurt the agent. It is not caused by his use of discretionary authority
in a way which is detrimental to the interest of the agent. The only thing that
really matters is that the principal acts after the contract is signed.
We find the same type of phenomenon in the theory of mixed oligopoly (see
Cremer, Marchand, and Thisse, 1990). From a social welfare point of view, a
mixed oligopoly, where some firms are state owned firms, can be worse than
a purely private oligopoly if the state owned firm cannot commit itself ex ante
to a production policy. In this case again, it is not misaligned incentives but the
impossibility to commit which is at the root of the problems.
vI. — concludIng remarks
The aim of this paper has been to discuss the way in which the economic lite-
rature has solved Williamson’s selective intervention puzzle. I have shown that
the common thread to all the solutions is the fact that the principal « stays in
the game » after the contract is signed, and cannot commit himself to a policy
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which would make the world similar to the world in which there would be no
vertical integration. On this basis, solutions that stress incompleteness of
contracts, the change in the allocation of authority, the change in the amount
of information available to the principal, all provide solutions that are theore-
tically consistent, and, furthermore, often not incompatible with each other.
Determining which solution provides a better guide to applied analysis
requires an examination of other features of the model.
There is another paradox, inspired by Coase (1960) (the Coase of the « pro-
blem of social cost »), which I find useful to illuminate the difficulties of deve-
loping a theory of vertical integration. Assume firms U and D realize that they
could gain by merging ; they could also obtain the same gains by signing a
contract that commits them to act as if they had merged. We would deduce that
mergers can never be beneficial – a sort of reverse selective intervention puzz-
le. The same analysis as was done in the current paper would show that the
same solution holds : it is not possible to provide the same incentives in the
two cases, and to study this phenomenon, we need a model that keeps the prin-
cipal in the game after the contract is signed.
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